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THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LIBERTARIAN RIGHTS
Mark Field*
Coercion occurs when one person's actions
are made to serve another person's ~ill, not for
his own but for the other's purposes.
Obviously, then, when coercion is present, individual
freedom is necessarily absent.
Thus, if one
advocates a free society, he must realize that an
essential element of any such society is the
requirement that infividual members be protected
against illegitimate, coercive intrusion into their
lives. An important implication of this protection
is the existence of private individual spheres of
authority wherein any unsolicited interference is
strictly prohibited.
These private spheres are
defined in terms of individual rights which guide
a person's actions as well as preserve and protect
that pergon from the actions of others in a social
context.
If these private spheres are not themselves to become an instrument of coercion, the
individual rights which define the range and
content of such spheres must not be determined
by the will of any person or group of persons.
To do so would sin;rly transfer the power of
coercion to that will.
If this consequence is to
be avoided, the existence of individual rights that
are independent of any particular will must be
possible.
Libertarianism, the doctrine that every
person is the owner of his or her life and that no
*Mark graduated from the University of
California at Irvine with a degree in Philosophy.
He continues his education at Brigham Young
University, and will graduate in June with a
master's degree in Political Science. He plans to
attend law school this fall.
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one is the owner of anyone else's life, 5 claims
that such rights do exist. The doctrine asserts
that each per~on ig in possession of a core of
fundamental rIghts
that are grounded in a
foundation that is, ultimately, obj7ctive, i. e. ,
beyond the power of personal will.
Nevertheless, even thoug'h this assertion is made, it seems
that a comprehensive, systematic demonstration of
such a foundation has never been given. Indeed,
one of the crucial drawbacks of perhaps the wos t
well-known statement of libertarian doctrine is
that no attempt is made to establish a foundation
for the rights that are so fundamental to
libertarian political theory. If libertarianism is to
present a serious challenge to other political
views,
must at least explore these foundations.
In view of this Et~ortcoming, this essay
is to present an argument
for a foundation to
the libertarian rig'hts to life, liberty, and property that is independent of the will of any
person or group of persons. In order to accomplish this aim, the essay will be divided into two
main sections. The first section will demonstrate
that natural, or human rights, when conceived of
within the libertarian tradition, have an objective
foundation.
The second section will then show
that the rights to life, liberty, and property are
natural rights.
In doing this, an objective
foundation for libertarian rights will be established.

dt

I

In arguing for a foundation of natural
rights, this first section is separated into four
parts, each one serving as a basis for the next.
In part one, a grounding for value in general is
provided, and, in part two, the same is done for
moral value.
From the conclusions reached in
these two sections, the argument continues by
considering that concept which constitutes the
ultimate moral value as well as the standard of
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moral value. Finally, in part four, the argument
is expanded in order to demonstrate that human
life, in the sense of living well, is the foundation
of natural rights.
Value in General
Perhaps the best way to initiate the argument is to give a general definition of value:
(1)

. . . (2)

A value is art10bject, an end, or a goal
of an action .
In order for value to exist, there must
be goal-directed action.

Given this conclusion, and in order to make
progress,
it is necessary to present the
conditions that must be met for goal-directed
actions to even exist.
To begin, it seems
apparent that if no alternative outcomes of action
exist, then there is no possibility of achieving a
go~~ and there can be no reason to act to gain
it.
In addition, it seems permissible to assume
that if success or failure with respect to a goal is
not conditional on some entity, then there can be
no rl~son for that entity to act to achieve the
goal.
From this, the third premise should read
as follows:
(3)

In order for goal-directed action to
exist, the following conditions must
obtain:
14
(a) There must be an alternative.
(b) There must be an entity whose
actions
determine
success
or
failurfs with
respect
to
some
goal.

However, if the consequences of success in
achieving some goal are no different to an entity
than the consequence of failure to achieve that
goal, then there can be nothing to differentiate
bei~een achieving some goal and not achieving
it.
This would imply, then, that the entity
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real alternative. We postulated above,
that goal-directed action requires the
of an alternative.
Thus, our third
is:
(c)

There must be an alternative that
makes a difference to (i. e., has a
conseqm¥Jfe for) the entity which
faces it.

Only when conditions (a) , (b) , and (c) are
satisfied is it possible for value to exist. With
this in mind, in order to proceed with the argument, the class of entities for which these conditions obtain must be defined.
As a means of initiating this segment of the
inquiry, two general claims need to be stated.
First, any object is either living or nonliving;
and second, it appears to be the case that there
is only one fundamental alternatiyg in the universe--existence or nonexistence.
From these
two propositions we can construct the following
complex disjunction: for any object, either (1) it
is living and faces the fundamental alternative or
does not or (2) it is nonliving and faces the
fundamental alternative or does not. An analysis
of the implications of this disjunction will provide
a conclusion that will enable us to proceed with
the argument.
To begin, the existence of all nonliving
objects is not dependent upon any specific cour:r§
of action, i. e. , they exist unconditionally.
Thus, if an object, X, is nonliving, we can
conclude that X exists unconditionally. However,
if X exists unconditionally, then, although X may
change or evolve toward increas~g complexity or
simplicity, it cannot cease to be.
And inasmuch
as X cannot cease to be, it is impossible for X to
either achieve or fail to achieve its own existence. But this means that X cannot face the
fundamental alternative.
Thus, from disjunct
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(2), we can conclude that if an object is non2tfen it cannot face the fundamental alternatIve.

livi~lg,

The first disjunct indicates that each
instance of life is a pr~£ess of self-sustaining and
self-generating action,
and that if this kind of
action ceases, then life necessarily ceases also.
This means that the existence of any living
ent¥K' Y, is conditional. L e., it can cease to
be.
And if Y can cease to be, then it is
possible for Y to face the fundamental alternative.
Thus, all living entities are capable of f~cing the
alternative of existellce or nonexistence.
However, since existence or nonexistence
constitutes the fundamental alternative, all other
alternatives are, ultimately, deriv~~ from it (Le.,
it creates all other alternatives).
Thus, if an
object cannot face the fundamental alternative,
then it cannot face any alternatives at all. Since
we concluded above that nonliving objects cannot
face the fundamental alternative. we can also
conclude that these objects are incapable of facing
any alternatives. But if an object cannot face
any alternatives, then it is not possible for the
conjunction of conditions (a)-(c) to obtain for
that object. The result is that these conditions
are inapplicable to nonliving objects. This is not
the case with living entities.
First. as stated previously, living entities
are capable of facing the fundamental alternative.
This satisfies condition (a). Second, since each
instance of life is a process of self-sustaining and
self-generating action, if this action ceases to
exist, life also ceases to exist. Thus, the actions
of living entities are capable of success or failure
with respect to their own existence.
This
satisfies condition (b). Finally, since it is possible for the actions of a living entity, in the
pursuit of a particular goal, to result (ult~tely)
in either its existence or nonexistence,
and
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since there is an obvious difference between these
two extremes, we can easily conclude that there
is a difference in the results of a living entity's
effort to achieve or not achieve the particular
goal or end it pursues. This conclusion shows
that the existence of the fundamental alternative
allows for the differentiation betweif achieving
and not achieving some goal or end.
However.
if an alternative allows for this kind of differentiation. then we can conclude that the fundamental alternative makes a difference to, or has H
consequence upon the entity which faces it. 2
This satisfies condition (c).
As we can see. the conjunction of conditions
(a)-(c) 2~s applicable to the class of living
entities.
However, at the beginning of this
section it was stated that for any object, it is
either living or nonliving. Therefore. seeing that
the conjunction of conditions (a)-(c) cannot apply
to nonliving objects and yet does apply to living
entities,
the
following
proposition
can
be
introduced:
(4)

Life, i. e., the class of living thing's, is
the only class of entities that %capable
of fUIlilTing conditions (a)-(c).

With proposition four in place, we can now
present the remainder of the argument for the
foundation of value:
(5)
. . . (6)
(7)
. . . (8)

Proposition (3) shows that if conditions
(a)-(c)
obtain,
then
goal-directed
actions are possible .
Since life fulfills conditions (a)-(c), life
makes possible goal-directed actions.
In addition, proposition (2) shows that
if goal-directed actions exist, then it is
possible for value to exist .
Since life makes goal-directed actions
possible, life also makes value possible.
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... (9)

Inasmuch as life fulfills conditions
(a)-(c). life makes possible the existence of value.
(10) Furthermore. if Y makes possible the
existence of Z. Yien Y is said to be the
foundation of Z .
• . . (11) Since
only
life
fulfills
conditions
(a)-(c). life is the foundation of all
value.

This conclusion establishes the concept of life
(the
process
of self-sustaining
and
selfgenerating action) as the only source of value.
The analysis now turns to the foundation of moral
value.
Moral Value
As before. perhaps the best way to initiate
this part of the argument is to give a brief
definition of a moral value:
(12) A moral value is an object. an end. or
a goal that is chosen to be a~2 object.
an end. or a goal of an action .
. . . (13) In order for moral value to exist. there
must be goal-directed action that is
aimed at an object which has been
chosen to be the object (or goal) of
that action.
Once again. in order to make progress we need to
present what conditions must be met in order for
this type of goal-directed action to exist. It is
apparent from previous conclusions that. since
moral value is a subset of value generally. conditions (a)-(c) are also required for moral value
to exist. Thus. proposition (14) should begin as
follows:
(14) In order for goal-directed actions to
exist that are aimed at an object which
has been chosen to be the object of
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that
must
(a)
(b)

(c)

action, the following conditions
obtain:
There must be an alternative.
There must be an entity whose
actions are capable of succeeding
or failing with respect to some
goal.
There must be an alternative that
makes a difference to the entity
which faces it.

However, given the definition of moral
the capacity for freedom of choice is
sessed by some entity, then it will not
ible for an object to be chosen as an
goal-directed action. Thus, the fourth
must be:
(d)

value, if
not posbe possobject of
condition

There must be an entity which
possesses 3tpe capacity for freedom
of choice.

Only when these four conditions are satisfied is it
possible for moral value to exist. With this in
mind, in order to proceed with the argument, the
class of entities for which these conditions obtain
must be determined.
As with value generally, there is only one
known class of entities that can fulfill the conjunction of all four conditions:
(15) Human life, i. e., the class of human
beings, is the only class of entities that
satisfies conditions (a)-(d).
The justification for this proposition is clear. As
concluded in the previous section, life is the only
class of entities that fulfills conditions (a)-(c).
Since human life is a subset of the class of living
things, we can also conclude that human life
fulfills these three conditions. Furthermore, it is
also the case (empirically) that only human life is
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known 3~0 possess the capacity for freedom of
choice.
Thus, only human life can satisfy
condition (d).
With the justification of proposition (15)
complete, presentation of the remainder of the
argument for the foundation of moral value can be
made:
(16) Proposition (14) shows that if conditions
(a)-(d) obtain, then it will be possible
for goal-directed action to exist that is
directed toward an object which has
been chosen to be the object of that
action.
· .. (17) Since human life fulfills conditions
(a)-(d), human life enables an object to
be chosen as an object of goal-directed
action.
(18) In addition, proposition (13) shows that
if there exists goal-directed action that
is directed at an object which has been
chosen to be the object of that action,
then moral value is possible.
· .. (19) Since human life makes possible goaldirected action that is directed at an
object which has been chosen as an
object of that action, human life also
makes moral value possible.
· .. (20) Inasmuch as human life fulfills conditions
(a)-(d),
human life makes
possible the existence of moral value.
(21) Furthermore, if Y makes possible the
existence of Z, then Y is said to be the
foundation of Z.
· .. (22) Since human life fulfills conditions
(a)-(d), human life is the foundation of
moral value.
Thus, human life is the final source of morality.
With the aid of this conclusion, and as a means of
progressing toward the foundation of natural
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rights, we must now argue that human life is the
standard of all moral value.
Ultimate Value/Standard of Value
fn order to show that human life constitutes
the standard of moral value, we must first demonstrate that human life is the ultimate moral- value.
To begin, suppose that Z is an object of choice.
If goal-directed actions exist that are aimed at
objects which have been chosen to be objects of
such action, then it is possible for Z to be chosen as an object of such action. Proposition (17)
shows, though, that in order for an object to be
chosen as an object of goal-directed action,
human life must exist. Thus, human life makes it
possible for Z to be chosen as an object of goaldirected action.
In addition, from proposition
(12) we know that if Z is an object that is chosen
to be an object of goal-directed action, then Z is
a moral value (i. e. , Z is morally valuable) .
Thus, human life makes Z as a moral value possible. However, it also seems that if a person
morally values Z, then that person must also
morally value the conditions by which ~ as a
This
morally valuable object, is made possible.
means that if a person morally values Z, then
that person must also morally value human life.
Since a moral value is an object that is chosen to
be an object of goal-directed action, if a person
chooses Z as the object towards which his action
will be directed, then those actions must also be
directed towards human life.
Thus, we can
conclude that:
(23) Since human life is the foundation of
morality and, therefore, makes it possible for an object to be chosen as an
object of goal-directed action,
all
goal-directed actions which are directed
toward an object which has been chosen
to be an object of that action are
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directed

toward

human

This allows us to continue the argument as follows: _
(24) If all goal-directed actions which are
directed toward objects which have been
chosen to be objects of such actions are
(ultimately) directed toward human life,
then human life must be the qJfal moral
end or g'oal of all such action .
•• . (25) If human life is the foundation of
morality, then human life is the final
moral end of all goal-directed actions
that are aimed at an object which has
been chosen to be an object of such
action.
(26) However, the final moral end or goal to
which all lesser (moral) goals are the
means is cO§Widered to be the ultimate
moral value .
• . . (27) Inasmuch as human life is the foundation of morality, human life is also the
ultimate moral value.
Given this statement, the conclusion that human
life is the standard of moral value can easily be
reached:
(28) In addition, inasmuch as the ultimate
moral value is the final (moral) end or
goal to which all lesser (moral) goals
are the means, it necessarily sets the
standard by whicgg all lesser goals are
morally evaluated .
. • . (29) Human life is also the standard of moral
value.
What we have shown to this point is what we
have sought: that the concept of human life, as
the foundation of morality, is also the ultimate
moral value as well as the standard of moral
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value.
Nevertheless, to simply conclude that
human life is the standard or morality is not
sufficient.
In order for this standard to be
better understood, an elaboration is necessary.
Living Well
First, it is necessary to demonstrate how (at
least some) libertarians perceive the concept of
living' well, and also, that human life, in this
sense of living well, is the standard of moral
value. T~ostart, since a standard is a basis for
judgment,
and since moral value is concerned
with conditions, situations, or circumsJfnces that
are good or bad, right or wrong,
we can
conclude that a standard of4:f0ral value is a basis
for judging or determining
what kinds of conditions or situations are morally good or bad,
right or wrong'. An important implication of this
particular conclusion is that the concept or principle which determines whether or not a condition
is morally right is equivalent to the standard of
morality. Thus, if we can identify the concept
which determines moral rightness, then we will
have also identified the standard of morality.
However, in order to determine whether or not a
condition is morally right, we must first become
clear on what it mean.f3 to say that a condition is
right for something.
To do this, we must
know, (1) what kind of thing the object is, and
(2) what t4f unique goal, end, or purpose of the
object is.
If these two criteria are defined,
then to say that a condition is morally right for
an object is to say that the condition is conducive
to the satisfacti~ of the object's unique goal,
end, or purpose.
In order to satisfy the first condition, it is
important to remember that we are dealing with
moral value and that morality applies only to
those entities whose natures are such that they
are capable of possessing the capacity for freedom
of choice. Since only human life has a nature
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that can satisfy this condition, morality only
applies to human life (i. e., it applies only to
human life (qua human life».
Thus, moral
rightness refers only to those conditions that are
right for human life (qua human life). However,
when -criteria (2) is added to this conclusion, we
obtain a more accurate characterization of moral
rightness: that it refers to those conditions that
are conducive to the satisfaction of the unique
end or purpose of human life (qua human life).
Nevertheless, even this definition of moral
rightness can be made clearer through an attempt
to better understand the content of the second
criteria. For instance, when we speak of human
life (qua human life), we are considering human
life not, for example, in the capacity of a lawyer
or a teacher but in the capacity of a human
being. This analysis concerns human life as the
kind of life that it is, i.e., given its nature.
From this we can conclude that human life (qua
human life)4sis equivalent to the natural end of
human life.
This allows us to make the statement that a condition is morally right if the
condition is conducive to the natural end of
human life.
This means, of course, that the
natural end of human life is the basis for determining moral rightness.
Therefore, since we
have already concluded that what determines
whether or not a condition is morally right is the
same as the moral standard, we can now conclude
that the natural end of human life must be the
standard of moral value.
This statement is
obviously more specific than the previous conclusions, but it is still unsatisfactory. At this
point, what constitutes the natural end of human
life must be determined. If we can do this, then
we will have a more definite standard of morality.
We can
stating that
living thing
of that life

initiate this part of our inquiry by
the proper or natural end of any
is constituted by the successful uf~
(given the kind of life that it is).
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The natural end of human life, then, would be
constituted by the successful use of that individual life (as the kind of life that it is, i . e. ,
given its nature as human life).
In order to
become more clear on this statement, we need to
make -use of the following general principles:
first, if there is some need or requirement, Y,
which explains or accounts for the existence of
some object, X, then X functions ,~ll if and only
if its use or enactment satisfies Y;
and second,
the result of X performing its function well (i. e. ,
the satisfaction of Y) constitutes the successful
use of that object g) toward which the satisfaction of Y is aimed.
What we must do now is to
discover what kinds of conclusions are brought
about when these principles are applied to human
life.
It seems undeniable that the very possibility
of sustaining human life (as the kind of life that
it is) depends upon the successful completion of
numerous processes which involve the performance
or utilization of various actions, capacities,
activities, faculties, etc. ~h' e., what we might
call acting' successfully) .
However, acting
successfully in this way depends upon the process of choosing to pursue and maintain the
proper gO§1f (i.e., what we might call moral
valuation).
We can conclude from this that the
existence of the process of moral valuation is
necessary for successfully performing and utilizing those activities and faculties which sustain
human life (as the kind of life that it is). Thus,
acting successfully in this way explains or
accounts for the process of moral valuation.
From this conclusion, and in accordance with the
first general principle stated in the previous
paragraph, we know not only that the function of
moral valuation is its use in regard to the satisfaction of acting successfully to sustain human
life (as the kind of life that it is), but also that
moral valuation performs its function well if and
only if its use actually satisfies successful action
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in this way. In addition to these statements, and
in accordance with the second general principle,
it is also clear that acting successfully in order
to sustain human life (as the kind of life that it
is) constitutes the successful use of that object
toward which such action is aimed. And, since
this type of action is necessarily aimed at human
life, we can finally conclude that the successful
use of any individual human life (as the kind of
life that it is) is equivalent to successfully performing and utilizing those activities and faculties
which sustain human life (as the kind of life that
it is). It is this conclusion that represents the
natural end of human life and, ultimately, the
standard of moral value.
From this conclusion, not only have we
achieved the desired degree of specificity, but we
have also demonstrated the overall intent of this
particular section.
It is apparent that acting
successfully, in the way we have described it, is
the same as living successfully as a human being
(given the nature of human life). 5~his is equivalent to the notion of living well.
Thus, not
only is it clear how (some) libertarians perceive
the concept of living well, but it is also clear
that we can conclude first, that living well is the
natural end of any individual human life and
finally, that:
.'.(2_9') Human life, i.e., living well, is the
standard of all moral value.
Given the conclusion of proposition (29'), we
can now continue with our argument for the
foundation of natural rights. We will begin anew
by reexamining the idea of a moral standard:
(30) A standard of moral value
for determining whether or
cular condition, situation,
stance is morally right or
or bad.

is the basis
not a partior circumwrong, good
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(31) Moral value deals only with those conditions that are good or bad, right or
wrong for human life (qua human life) .
. ·.(32) Human life, Le., living well, is the
basis for determining whether or not a
condition is right for human life (qua
human life).
However, the context within which a condition
may be right for human life (qua human life) is
variable; e. g., a condition may be 5~ght in either
an individual or a social context.
From this,
the argument continues by indicating the context
we choose:
(33) A particular condition may be right for
human life (qua human life) in a social
context .
. ·.(34) Human life, i.e., living well, is the
basis for determining whether or not a
particular condition is right for human
life (qua human life) in a social context.
With this conclusion, a brief characterization of
the libertarian notion of a natural right is necessary.
Natural or human rights are no different
from any other rights we might possess, except
that our entitlement to them is fundamentally
justified by the fact that we are human beings.
As one prominent libertarian thinker has stated,
"If someone has a human right to X or to do Y,
then (a) he or she is a human being, and (b) it
is because of this fact alone that certain conditions or circumstances are bO!5\ possible and
right for him in a social context."
These kinds
of rights indicate the social conditions that are
good or right for people, ~ virtue of their
humanity, in a social context.
From here, we
can continue our argument by giving a definition
of a natural right:

LIBERTARIAN RIGHTS
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. ·.(36)
(37)
(38)

••• (39)
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A natural right is a condition that is
right for human life (qua human life) in
a social context.
Human life, Le.. living well, is the
basis for determining natural rights.
This means that human life (in the
sense of living well) makes natural
rights possible.
If Y makes Z possible, then Y is said
to be the foundation of Z.
Human life, L e., living well, is the
foundation of natural rights.

To this point we have shown that the concept of life is the foundation of value in general,
and that the concept of human life is the foundation of morality.
In addition, as a means of
establishing a foundation for natural rights, we
also demonstrated that human life is the ultimate
moral value as well as the standard of moral
value. Nevertheless, we stated at that point that
to simply conclude that human life is the standard
of moral value was not sufficient. In order for
this standard to be more workable, we had to
show that human life. in the sense of living well,
is the standard of moral value. From this, we
finally concluded that human life, L e., living
well. is the foundation of natural rights.
This
brings us to the end of section one. From here
we will want to demonstrate that the most fundamental.1ibertarian rights are natural rights.
II

In order to conclude that libertarian rights
are natural rights. we must show that they
represent conditions that are right for human life
(qua human life); Le .• that they are conducive
to living well, in the way we have defined it, in
a social context.
Perhaps the most convenient
way to begin is to simply state that:
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(40) The most fundamental libertarian rights
are the fdghts to life, liberty, and
property.
Now, by considering the conclusions reached in
section one, we can expand the argument by
presenting the following sequence of premises:
(41) From proposition (35) we know that a
natural right is a condition that is right
for human life (qua human life) in a
social context .
. . . (42) The rights to life, liberty, and property are natural rights if and only if
life, liberty, and property constitute
conditions that are right for human life
(qua human life) in a social context.
e43) Furthermore, a condition is right for
human life (qua human life) in a social
context if that condition is conducive to
the satisfaction of the natural end of
human life in a social context.
(44) The natural end of human life is living
well.
... (45) The rights to life, liberty, and property are natural rights if and only if
life, liberty, and property constitute
conditions that are conducive to the
satisfaction of living well in a social
context.
(46) And, living well (in a social context) is
equivalent to successfully performing
and utilizing those activities and faculties which sustain human life (qua
human life, i. e., as the kind of life
that it is) in a social context.
At this point in the argument we must pause and
provide some sort of content for the phrase "the
kind of life that human life is."
We can single out two conditions that must
be satisfied for persons to even exist; these
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conditions therefore constitute the nature of man.
Although the question of whether or not man has
a nature is somewhat controversial, many, including libertarians, argue that the very act of
talking about man (in the ways we have been
discussing him, i.e., with respect to morality)
implies that his nature is, at least to some
degree, knowable. The first condition for human
existence (one we have already discussed) is that
man is free, i. e., capable of choice. The second
is that man is capab!4i7 of conceptual awareness,
i. e., he is rational.
Each individual person
possesses (at least) both of these conditions.
From this brief discussion we can state that:
(47) Human life (Le., human life (qua
human life» is life that is free and
rational.
We can further conclude that:
... (48) The rights to life, liberty, and property are natural rights if and only if
life, liberty, and property constitute
conditions that are conducive (in a
social context) to the successful performance and utilization of those activities
and faculties which sustain human life
as the kind of life that it is, i. e., as
life that is free and rational.
If the conditions of this conclusion can be met,
then the goal of establishing a foundation for
libertarian rights will be achieved.
In this final segment of the argument, we
will briefly consider the conditions represented by
life, liberty, and property in order to determine
whether or not they are conducive to the natural
end of human life within a social context. It is
important to indicate, however, that the rights to
these conditions, when conceived of within the
libertarian framework, are freedom rights or
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rights to action. 58 Thus, these concepts represent conditions of action.
The first, and most important 59 condition we
will examine is that of life. As was mentioned
earlier in this essay, life is a process of selfsustaining and self-generated action.
However,
wi thin the context of our consideration of life, its
definition is slightly more expansive: it is the
self-generated process of behavior that leads to
the continued existence of some entity in a given
form so U~'6t it may persist in sustaining its own
existence.
In reference to the class of human
beings, our definition of life may be equated with
the freedom of a person to take all actions
required by the nature of a rational being for the
support, the perpetuation, anetHthe fulfillment of
that person's own existence.
It is readily
apparent that in the absence of this condition,
living well is inconceivable.
Thus, life is
essential to the very possibility of acting
successfully to sustain human life (qua human
life) in a social context.
From this, we are
justified in claiming that:
(49) Life constitutes a condition that is
conducive to the successful performance
and utilization of those activities and
faculties which sustain (one's own) life
as a life that is free and rational (in a
social context).
The second condition we will examine, (political) liberty, may be characterized as the freedom
to choose the ends that one desires to pursue in
his life, without the fear that those ends might
be frustrated by the Hbitrary will of others or
coercion by the state.
In the absence of any
such freedom, it is reasonable to assume that if a
person is to have any ends at all ~ those ends (in
addition to the actions required to ob~!in them)
must be forced or imposed upon him.
But if
this is the case, then it is not possible for an
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individual to a1f4 for himself in successfully sustaining his life.
And since realizing the natural
end of human life is something that et%h person
can only (fully) achieve for himself,
without
(political) liberty, the achievement of living well
in a social context is inconceivable. From this we
are justified in claiming that:
(50) Liberty (political) constitutes a condition that is conducive (in a social
context) to the successful performance
and utilization of those activities and
faculties which sustain one's ow n life as
a life that is free and rational.
The final condition for examination is the
right of property. Strictly speaking, property is
the product of a person's own effort. However,
it was mentioned earlier that libertarian rights are
freedom rights or rights to action.
In this
context, property is not to be identified as any
particular object. Rather, it is the actions for,
and consequences of, producing or earning an
object.
Thus, the condition represented by
property may be characterized as the freedom
gain, keep, use, and dispose of material value.
However, since (as we indicated above) the
natural end of a person's life is something that
only he can (fully) achieve for himself, i.e., by
his own effort, then, without the condition that
property implies, the achievement of living well in
a social context is not possible. Thus, we can
state that:

sg

(51) Property is a condition that is conducive (in a social context) to the successful performance and utilization of
those activities and faculties which
sustain (one's own) life as a life that is
free and rational.
Given these three propositions, we know that
life, liberty, and property represent conditions
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that are conducive to the natural end of human
life within a social context. The argument continues by concluding that:
•.• (52) The

fundamental libertarian rights to
life, liberty, and property are natural
rights.

From here,
statement:

we can finally

make the

following

... (53) Inasmuch as human life, i.e., living
well, is the foundation of natural rights
(see proposition (39», human life,
i. e., living well, is the foundation of
the fundamental libertarian rights to
life, liberty, and property.
This is the conclusion that the overall analysis
has sought to verify.
At the beginning of the paper, our stated
aim was to present an argument for an objective
foundation for libertarian rights, i. e., rights that
are independent of the will of any person or
group of persons.
Human life in the sense of
living well satisfies this objectivity.
In dealing
with the concept of humanity, we do not determine what it 61f1eans to be human, rather, we
discover this.
We can no more control the
nature of human life, those essential characteristics of freedom and rationality which define us as
human beings, than we can alter the past. These
essential characteristics are facts of reality that
exist regardless of any personal or group desires
or actions to change them. Thus, we are not in
a position to alter the fact that the nature of man
is such that he is free and rational and that
living well (in the way it has been defined in this
paper) is the natural end of his life.
the

In conclusion, we should keep in mind that
argument presented here is simply a
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description of what some, though certainly not
all, libertarians feel is the foundation of the
rights they advocate.
The argument may, in
fact, be unsound. In any case, it is hoped that
what has been presented in this essay might
provide a basis for informed comment upon the
libertarian alternative.
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